

## Message Text

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 01403 01 OF 02 091102Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 MCT-01 INR-10 AF-10  
/049 W

-----069350 091109Z /12-S

R 061000Z JUL 78  
FM USINT BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6425  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
USINT HAVANA  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1403

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SECTION INFO ADDED)

E.O. 11652: NA  
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, XF, IZ  
SUBJ: DE BORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN

REF BAGHDAD 1379 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY. ON JULY 1, RCC VICE-CHAIRMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN  
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01403 01 OF 02 091102Z

GAVE A TWO-HOUR INTERVIEW TO NEWSWEEK'S ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE,  
INVITED TO BAGHDAD FOR THAT PURPOSE. SADDAM TOOK PREDICTABLY  
TOUGHER STANCE FOR PUBLICATION THAN HE HAS IN RECENT PRIVATE  
CONVERSATIONS, AND DID NOT REVEAL TOO MUCH THAT HAD NOT ALREADY  
BEEN STATED OR GUESSED. HE SPOKE EXTEMPORANEOUSLY, PROVIDING  
A GLIMPSE OF HIS THOUGHT PROCESSES ES WALP AS HIS BELIEFS.  
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INTERVIEW IS PROBABLY AS MUCH IN THE FACT

AND THE TIMING AS IN THE CONTENT. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO EMBARGO STORY PENDING PUBLICATION O/A JULY 10. END SUMMARY.

2. ARNAUD DE BORCHGRAVE ARRIVED IN BAGHDAD JUNE 29, INVITED BY THE GOI FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTERVIEWING STRONGMAN SADDAM HUSSEIN. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE ON JULY 1 AND DE BORCHGRAVE PROVIDED US WITH A COPY OF THE FULL TRANSCRIPT SHORTLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE.

3. THE QUESTIONS WERE NOT POSED IN ADVANCE, AND FOR THAT REASON HTE RESPONSES ARE NOT EXACTLY THE FULL AND CLEAR PARTY LINE. SADDAM HEDGED ON SOME OF THE QUESTIONS, APPEARED TO MISUNDERSTAND OTHERS, AND CONTRADICTED HIMSELF AT LEAST ONCE. NONETHELESS, THE INTERVIEW WAS AN OCCASION OF SORTS AND ATTENTION TO HIS WORDS IS MERITED. THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS ATTEMPT TO SUMMARIZE THE MAIN POINTS.

4. RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IRAQ TENDS TO SEE THE WORLD SITUATION THROUGH BI-POLAR GLASSES. IT RECOGNIZES THAT THE SOVIET UNION POSES A THREAT BUT EQUATES IT WITH A SIMILAR THREAT FROM THE U.S. SIDE. EACH OF THE SUPERPOWERS HAS DIFFERENT MEANS FOR EXTENDING ITS CONTROL, AND IRAQ FEARS BOTH OF THEM. NONETHELESS, WHEN TOLD BY DE BORCHGRAVE THAT LEADERS OF THE WORLD AS DIVERSE AS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 01403 01 OF 02 091102Z

GISCARD, HUA, SIAD BARRE, SENGOR AND OTHERS HAVE ALL WARNED OF THE AGGRESSIVE SOVIET POLICY, SADDAM SAID "YOU CAN ADD OUR WARNING TO THAT, TOO." HE SAID RECENT EXECUTIONS OF COMMUNISTS WERE INTENDED AS A WARNING TO THE SOVIETS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THOSE INVOLVED WERE SHOT, NOT HUNG, BECAUSE THEY HAD PLOTTED AGAINST THE STATE, NOT BECAUSE THEY WERE COMMUNISTS. SADDAM SAID THAT THERE WERE INDEED A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS IN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, BUT CRITICISMS OF THE POLICIES OF A FRIENDLY COUNTRY SHOULD NOT BE JUDGED IN THE CONTEXT OF A COMING CHANGE IN THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

5. ARAB-ISRAELI QUESTION. IRAQ DIFFERS WITH THE PLO AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SO-CALLED REJECTIONISTS FRONT SINCE IT IS OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF CAPITULATION POLICIES AND THE IDEA OF SETTLEMENTS WITH ISRAEL. IRAQ DOES NOT ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF A ZIONIST ENTITY EVEN WITHIN 1967 BORDERS, AND SEES WAR AS THE ONLY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM, PERHAPS NOT TODAY OR TOMORROW BUT IN TIME. (COMMENT: IN AN EARLIER STATEMENT ANSWERING A QUESTION CONCERNING RELATIONS WITH THEU.S., SADDAM SELECTED AS THE SORT OF CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY THAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED MEANINGFUL

CONVINCING THE "ZIONIST AGGRESSOR THAT IT MUST CHANGE ITS POSITION TO NON-AGGRESSION." SADDAM HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT IRAQ WOULD ACCEPT A SETTLEMENT TO WHICH ALL ARAB PARTIES AGREED, AND THIS IS PROBABLY A MORE ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE IRAQI POSITION. END COMMENT)

6. GULF SECURITY. IRAQ IS PLEASED THAT IRAN HAS PUBLICLY ABANDONED ITS EFFORTS TO DEVELOP MUTUAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF THE GULF. WHAT IS NEEDED IS NORMAL BILATERAL RELATIONS AND NO OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE. IRAQ WILL NOT HEISTATE TO INTERVENE AGAIN IN DHOFAR OR ELSEWHERE IF IRAN OR ANYONE ELSE SHOULD DO SO. ASKED IF HE WERE CONCERNED BY RECENT STATEMENTS BY LIBYA'S QADDAFI THAT THE LATTER PLANNED TO DEDICATE HIMSELF TO PROMOTING LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 04 BAGHDA 01403 01 OF 02 091102Z

POPULAR REVOLUTIONS IN THE GULF, SADDAM INDICATED IN GENERAL THAT HE WAS NOT. POPULAR REVOLUTIONS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY CREATE SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE GULF OR LEAD TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE SUPERPOWERS OR OTHER "FOREIGN" STATES.

7. LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND TERRORIS. IRAQ WILL REMAIN OPEN FOR PALESTINIAN LIBERATION GROUPS, BUT IS CLOSED TO EUROPEAN TERRORISTS. SOME PALESTINIANS MAY BE INVOLVED WITH EUROPEANS OUTSIDE IRAQ, BUT THE GOI IS OPPOSED TO AND UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH ACTIVITIES INSIDE THE COUNTRY. IRAQ DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH THE AIMS OR POLICIES OF RESISTANCE GROUPS THAT IT HAS ASSISTEE, EXCEPT TO POINT OUT WHEN THEIR ACTIVITIES, E.G. AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS, DAMAGE THE CAUSE OR REFLECT BADLY ON IRAQ.

8. ARMS DIVERSIFICATION. IRAQI'S OBJECTIVE IS TO ADVANCE ITS OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THOSE OF THE ARAB NATION.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 01403 02 OF 02 080501Z  
ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 MCT-01 INR-10 AF-10  
/049 W

-----060400 090518Z /12-S

R 061030Z JUL 78  
FM USINT BAGHDAD  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6426  
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
USINT HAVANA  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1403

FOR THIS PURPOSE IT NEEDS ARMED FORCES CAPABLE OF DEFENDING ITS SOVEREIGNTY, GUARANTEEING ITS INDEPENDENCE AND PARTICIPATING IN THE ARAB NATION'S BATTLES. IRAQ WILL THEREFORE OBTAIN THE WEAPONS IT NEEDS WITHOUT CONCERN FOR THE SOURCE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN A CHANGE IN POLICY OR IN RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES.

9. RELATIONS WITH CUBA. IRAQ FINDS THE CUBAN POSITION DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND, SO IT IS HARD TO PREDICT THEIR LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 01403 02 OF 02 080501Z

INVOLVEMENT IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA. THE CUBANS HAVE SAID THAT THEY WILL NOT SEND TROOPS UNLESS INVITED BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF THOSE COUNTRIES, AND WILL NOT HELP THE ETHIOPIANS AGAINST THE ERITREANS UNLESS A FOREIGN POWER INTERVENES ON ERITREA'S SIDE.

10. RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. WHILE IRAQ HAS NOT NOTICED ANY AMERICAN ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE DIRECTLY IN ITS AFFAIRS OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS, THERE IS AN EVIDENT ANTI-IRAQ POLICY SINCE THE U.S. OFTEN SPEAKS OF IRAQ AS A SOVIET SATELLITE. THE CONTINUED AND GROWING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, AS WELL AS EFFORTS TO DIVIDE THE ARAB WORLD, STILL STAND IN THE WAY OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. SO FAR, WORDS RATHER THAN DEEDS ARE THE ONLY REFLECTION OF ANY SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, EVEN THOUGH SOME ARAB COUNTRIES ARE SUPPORTING AMERICAN AIMS. "THE

LACK OF NORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IS, HOPEFULLY, A TEMPORARY CASE, NO MATTER HOW LONG IT MAY LAST."

11. SOVIET OVERFLIGHTS AND THE HORN. SADDAM DENIED THAT IRAQ HAD PERMITTED SOVIET AIRCRAFT TO OVERFLY ITS TERRITORY ON THE WAY TO ETHIOPIA. "WE OBJECTED, AND GOT A FORMAL UNDERTAKING FROM THE SOVIETS THAT THESE PLANES WOULD GO TO SOUTH YEMEN INSTEAD." IT WAS EVIDENT THAT SOME OF THE SHIPMENTS WOULD GO ON BY OTHER MEANS, BUT SINCE IRAQ HAS FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH BOTH THE PDRY AND THE USSR IT WAS NOT REASONABLE TO TELL THEM WHAT COULD OR COULD NOT BE DONE WITH THE SUPPLIES ONCE THEY GO TO ADEN. "THE IMPORTANT THING IS OUR OFFICIAL POLICY WHICH WAS NOT TO SUPPORT MENGISTU." SIAD BARRE IS STILL IRAQ'S FRIEND, AND SUPPORT AS WELL AS ACTIVE ASSISTANCE ALSO CONTINUES FOR THE ERITREANS.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 01403 02 OF 02 080501Z

12. COMMENT: DE BORCHGRAVE SHARED HIS TRANSCRIPT WITH THE BELGIAN, IRANIAN AND UK AMBASSADORS, WHO IN TURN PROVIDED COPIES TO SELECTED COLLEAGUES (LEBANESE, SWISS, FRENCH, MOROCCANS). THEIR CONSENSUS: THE FACT THAT THE INTERVIEW TOOK PLACE IS OF SOME SIGNIFICANCE; THE CONTENTS ARE NOT OF THE SAME IMPORTANCE. WE GENERALLY CONCUR, BUT DOUBT THAT THE EVENT BY ITSELF HERALDS ANY MAJOR CHANGES.

13. SADDAM APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SEEKING, ABOVE ALL, A MEANS FOR PUTTING IRAQ'S VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES BEFORE A LARGE WESTERN AUDIENCE. OTHER THAN A HIGH LEVEL OF CRATIVE CYNICISM WITH REGARD TO THE OVERFLIGHTS, HE DID NOT REVEAL TOO MUCH THAT WAS REALLY NEW. HIS PRESENTATION WAS NOT PARTICULARLY ADRIOT, PERHAPS IN PART BECAUSE OF THE SIMULTANEOUS TRANSLATION THAT WAS EMPLOYED, BUT HE DID SUCCEED IN GETTING THE MAJOR POINTS ACROSS. HE ALSO TOOK A SOMEWHAT HARDER LINE THAN HE REPORTEDLY HAS IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS, BUT THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE IN LIGHT OF THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESENTATION. FROM THE BAGHDAD PERSPECTIVE, IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE WHAT NEWSWEEK'S EDITORS SELECT AS THE SALIENT FEATURES OF THE INTERVIEW.

14. FOR NEA/ARN: GIVEN THE NATURE OF OUR FACILITIES, WE HAVE NOT ATTEMPTED TO REPRODUCE, FOR OTHER POSTS THAT MIGHT BE INTERESTED, THE TRANSCRIPT OR THE EDITED VERSION THAT WERE POUCHED TO YOU JULY 3.  
PECK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, TEXT, PRESS CONFERENCES, LIBERATION FRONTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1978BAGHDA01403  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D780283-1112  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** BAGHDAD  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780793/aaaaczxn.tel  
**Line Count:** 275  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** daf4fb7a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** LIMITED OFFICIAL USE  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 BAGHDAD 1379  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 2110112  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** DE BORCHGRAVE INTERVIEW WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN  
**TAGS:** PEPR, PINT, SOPN, XF, IZ, UR, PLO, (HUSSEIN, SADDAM), (BORCHGRAVE, ARNAUD DE)  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/daf4fb7a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014